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NOTE
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE V. DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL COMMITTEE: REINTERPRETING THE COURT’S
ROLE IN ELECTION LAW CHALLENGES
CARLY L. BRODY*
In Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee,1
the Supreme Court of the United States addressed whether the date prescribed
by Wisconsin law to receive absentee ballots in the State’s April 2020
primary election could be extended in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic
(“COVID-19”).2 Many voters who timely requested their ballots did not
receive their ballots in time to return them before the statutory deadline.3
COVID-19 created an unprecedented late surge in absentee ballot requests
that overwhelmed election officials and resulted in a backlog of sending
ballots to voters.4 The lower federal courts granted a six-day extension for
receiving absentee ballots, considering when the ballots would be “received
by” as the only relevant inquiry.5 On appeal, the Supreme Court focused on
when the ballots would be “received by” and “postmarked by,” and
weakened the lower courts’ remedy by requiring that ballots received up to
six days after the election also be postmarked by election day.6
The Court decided the case by narrowly focusing on the notion that
lower federal courts should not change election rules close to an election,
while failing to properly weigh other election-specific considerations.7 The
Court’s reasoning in Republican National Committee laid the groundwork
© 2021 Carly L. Brody.
*
J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author first
thanks the Maryland Law Review editorial staff for their insightful comments and diligent edits
throughout the writing process. She also thanks Professors Mark Graber, Max Stearns, and Stephen
Mortellaro for their generous time and invaluable feedback. Finally, the author thanks her family
and friends for their endless support and encouragement, especially her father Richard and her
brother-in-law Brad for their thoughtful discussions about this Note.
1. 140 S. Ct. 1205 (2020) (per curiam) [hereinafter Republican Nat’l Comm.].
2. Id. at 1206.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 21–22; see also infra notes 217–221 and accompanying
text.
4. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1210 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 35–38.
6. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206.
7. See infra Section IV.A.
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for more emergency judicial decisions by lower courts as the 2020 General
Election approached, which relied on the same reasoning and unfortunately
precipitated further confusion and disenfranchisement in the midst of a public
health emergency.8 In light of these repercussions, this Note argues that (1)
the Court should not have intervened in the Wisconsin dispute, and that by
doing so, the Court threatened its legitimacy;9 (2) the Court improperly
considered the timing of the election by relying on the Purcell principle as a
rigid rule10 and by applying it in a way that contradicted the principle’s
purpose;11 (3) the Court emphasized the timing of the election while
neglecting to fully account for the election law’s burden on voters;12 and (4)
the dissent’s reasoning insufficiently assessed the constitutional analyses
required in deciding election-related challenges.13
I. THE CASE
Wisconsin planned to hold its spring election in person on Tuesday,
April 7, 2020, but this plan was complicated by the emerging COVID-19
pandemic.14 The ballots included the presidential primaries; a Wisconsin
Supreme Court seat; three Wisconsin Court of Appeals seats; over 100 other
judgeships; over 500 school board seats; and thousands of other local
positions.15 In the weeks leading up to the election, Wisconsin reported more
than 1,0000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and approximately twenty-four
deaths attributable to the disease,16 but experts estimated that the actual
number of Wisconsin citizens infected was ten times higher and projected
that cases would continue rising.17 The surge in cases prompted Wisconsin’s
governor to issue a shelter-in-place order on March 24, 2020, to slow the
virus’s spread.18 ID. Meanwhile, options for voting in-person before or on
election day became severely limited as a number of polling places closed
when poll workers and municipal clerks canceled their shifts and the
Wisconsin Elections Commission (“WEC”) expressed public health concerns
about those sites that remained open.19 FN. Because voting in person during
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
See infra Section IV.B.2.
See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Section IV.D.
Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206, 1208 (2020) (per curiam).
Id. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1208 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 960–61 (W.D. Wis. 2020).
Id.
Id. at 961, 965.
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the pandemic is a public health risk and state public officials encouraged
voters to vote absentee, Wisconsin’s absentee ballot requests rose to
unprecedented levels.20 For the April 2020 primary election, at least
1,119,439 voters requested absentee ballots—nearly one million more than
in 2016, which had the most requests of the four previous spring elections.21
Processing these demands overwhelmed election officials and resulted in
backlogs that threatened thousands of ballots from arriving in time to be
counted.22 COVID-19 also resulted in United States Postal Service (“USPS”)
slow-downs and, combined, these delays made the deadline for receiving
absentee ballots at 8:00 P.M. on election day “completely unworkable.”23
In the two weeks leading up to the election, Plaintiffs—including
individual Wisconsin voters, community organizations, the Democratic
National Committee, and the Democratic Party of Wisconsin—filed three
suits against the WEC in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin.24 The suits challenged multiple statutory requirements
for the April 7, 2020, election.25 Relevant to the Supreme Court’s opinion
and this Note is Wisconsin’s statutory deadline for receiving absentee ballots,
which was 8:00 P.M. on election day.26 On March 28, the district court
consolidated the three cases.27 Additionally, the district court granted the
Republican National Committee’s and the Republican Party of Wisconsin’s
motion to intervene on behalf of the WEC.28
On March 27, 2020, Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction from the
district court to extend the deadline for clerks to receive absentee ballots
mailed in by voters.29 The district court held an evidentiary hearing and oral
argument on April 1, 2020.30 The following day, the court granted the
Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the statutory
20. Id. at 957–58, 960; Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1208–09 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
21. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Bostelmann, 451 F.
Supp. 3d at 961.
22. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 961–62.
23. Id. at 962.
24. Id. at 957; Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
25. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 957.
26. Id. at 958–59.
27. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
28. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, No. 20-cv-249-wmc, at *12 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 28,
2020).
29. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 958. Plaintiffs also sought an extension of the deadline for
absentee ballots; suspension of the witness signature requirement on absentee ballots; and
reconsideration of the court’s ruling on the by-mail absentee deadline and documentation
requirements. Id. However, the issue on appeal in the Supreme Court involved the extension of the
deadline to receive absentee ballots. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206.
30. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 958.
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voting deadlines “impose an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote.”31
In assessing whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the court conducted a
two-step inquiry.32 The court first evaluated whether the Plaintiffs met a
preliminary threshold by demonstrating: “(1) that [they] will suffer
irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief during the pendency of
[their] action; (2) inadequate remedies at law exist; and (3) [they have] a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.”33 After determining that the
Plaintiffs had satisfied this threshold, the court conducted a balancing
analysis “to determine whether the balance of harm favors the moving party
or whether the harm to other parties or the public sufficiently outweighs the
movant’s interests.”34
The district court granted an injunction to extend the statutory deadline
to receive absentee ballots from 8:00 P.M. on election day, April 7, 2020, to
4:00 P.M. on April 13, 2020. 35 However, the court did “not add a postmarked-by date requirement” and relied on WEC’s statement that it did not
oppose extending the deadline.36 The court reasoned that “even the most
diligent voter may be unable to return his or her ballot in time to be
counted.”37
In an emergency appeal on April 3, 2020, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s six-day extension
for receiving absentee ballots.38 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted the application for stay on April 6, 2020 to decide “whether absentee
ballots now must be mailed and postmarked by election day, Tuesday, April
7, as state law would necessarily require, or instead may be mailed and
postmarked after election day, so long as they are received by Monday, April
13.”39
II. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Republican National Committee, the issue before the Supreme Court
was whether to stay the lower courts’ grant of preliminary injunction. 40 The
31. Id. at 959, 969.
32. Id. at 968.
33. Id. (quoting Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858
F.3d 1034, 1044 (7th Cir. 2017)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 959.
36. Id. at 976–77.
37. Id. at 976.
38. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, No. 20–1538, 2020 WL 3619499, at *8 (7th Cir.
Apr. 3, 2020).
39. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206 (2020) (per curiam).
40. Id.
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preliminary injunction permitted absentee ballots to be mailed in and
received for up to six days after the 2020 Wisconsin primary election in the
midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.41 In a per curium opinion, the Court ruled
that the district court erred by (1) granting relief that the Plaintiffs did not
request in their preliminary injunction motions, and (2) altering election laws
only five days before the election.42 The Court reasoned that precedent
prohibited lower federal courts from changing “the election rules on the eve
of an election.”43 The Court categorized the district court’s eleventh-hour
order as “judicially created confusion” and observed that Purcell v.
Gonzalez,44 which cautioned against issuing conflicting court orders close to
an election,45 demanded it be rebuked.46
The Court emphasized that the Plaintiffs themselves did not ask for the
six-day grace period in their preliminary injunction motions.47 Then, the
Court justified its intervention by explaining that it has a responsibility to
correct a lower court’s error in changing the election rules so close to the
election.48 The Court also equated the timing to that of absentee voters who
requested their ballots late in previous Wisconsin elections.49 Finally, the
Court claimed the dissent disregarded that the State already extended the
receipt deadline for absentee ballots from April 7 to April 13 “to
accommodate Wisconsin voters.”50 The Court maintained that the Plaintiffs
actually requested an extension to expand the opportunity to vote absentee,
not an extension by which ballots may be cast and counted.51 In granting a
partial stay pending final disposition of the appeal by the Seventh Circuit, the
Court concluded that absentee ballots could only be counted if they were (1)
postmarked by election day, April 7, 2020, and received by April 13, 2020,
at 4:00 P.M.; or (2) hand-delivered by April 7, 2020, at 8:00 P.M.52
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg rejected the Court’s characterization that the
case merely presented “a narrow, technical question”; she instead argued that
the issue was “whether tens of thousands of Wisconsin citizens [could] vote
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1206–07.
43. Id. at 1207 (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam)).
44. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).
45. Id. at 4–5.
46. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (reasoning that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence “that these voters here would be
in a substantially different position from late-requesting voters in other Wisconsin elections with
respect to the timing of their receipt of absentee ballots”).
50. Id. at 1207–08.
51. Id. at 1208.
52. Id.

1196

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:1191

safely in the midst of a pandemic.”53 Justice Ginsburg contended that the
district court’s order allowed Wisconsin citizens to do so and expressed her
fear that the Court’s outcome would result in “massive
disenfranchisement.”54 She reasoned that many voters who timely requested
their ballots would not receive them prior to the postmarked-by deadline.55
In rejoinder to the majority’s concerns, Justice Ginsburg first explained
that although the Plaintiffs did not request that ballots postmarked after April
7, 2020 be counted in their preliminary injunction motions, they requested
that relief at the preliminary injunction hearing.56 Next, she argued that the
majority’s hesitation regarding the timing of the district court’s response so
close to the election made its decision, which was “even closer to the
election,” even “more inappropriate.”57 In response to the Court’s concern
that the district court’s order permitted voters to vote after election day,
Justice Ginsburg maintained that the district court’s decision to enjoin
publication of the election results before April 13, 2020, safeguarded an
accurate depiction of the results.58 She reasoned that these concerns “pale in
comparison to the risk that tens of thousands of voters will be
disenfranchised” and advocated for “[e]nsuring an opportunity for the people
of Wisconsin to exercise their votes.”59
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution does not grant an affirmative right to
vote in national and state elections, but courts have long recognized an
implicit fundamental political right to vote.60 The Constitution prohibits
states from denying the right to vote on the bases of race,61 sex,62 age,63 and

53. Id. at 1211 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1209, 1211.
55. Id. at 1209.
56. Id. at 1210.
57. Id. at 1210–11.
58. Id. at 1211.
59. Id.
60. Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[T]he political franchise of voting . . . is regarded as a fundamental political
right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.”); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554–55 (1964)
(“It has been repeatedly recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right
to vote . . . and to have their votes counted . . . . [because] [t]he right to vote freely for the candidate
of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society.”); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 665 (1966) (“[T]he right to vote in state elections is implicit . . . .”).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
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failure to pay a poll tax.64 However, the Constitution grants states the
authority to create election codes for primary and general elections—
including elections at the federal level—and reserves powers for states to
oversee elections of the state legislature.65 Constitutional challenges to state
election codes often invoke the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and courts
evaluate the challenged law’s burdens on voters in determining the
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply.66 Section A describes state voting
laws.67 Section B discusses constitutional challenges to state election laws.68
Section C examines the Purcell principle, which courts frequently reference
in emergency decisions.69 Section D explores the framework of the
Anderson-Burdick balancing test, which courts frequently apply when
assessing the likelihood of success on the merits in preliminary injunction
analyses of constitutional challenges to election laws.70
A. State Voting Laws
The Constitution confers broad power on the states to establish rules
regulating federal elections, and states also have a reserved power to create
laws for their state legislature elections.71 To ensure order in the election
process, states have created election codes for holding elections at the state
and federal levels.72 In addition to prescribing the time, place, and manner
of holding primary and general elections, states also specify the qualifications
for voters and procedures for voter registration.73 They also establish the
qualifications and selection criteria for candidates.74

64. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1.
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
66. See infra Section III.B.
67. See infra Section III.A.
68. See infra Section III.B.
69. See infra Section III.C.
70. See infra Section III.D. The “Anderson-Burdick balancing test” was established by two
cases, Anderson v. Celebrezze, 469 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434
(1992).
71. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”).
72. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather
than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”); Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130
(7th Cir. 2004) (“The Constitution . . . . confers on the states broad authority to regulate the conduct
of elections, including federal ones.”).
73. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 (explaining that states have developed “comprehensive, and in
many respects complex, election codes” for state and federal elections).
74. Id.
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Unlike the federal constitution, most state constitutions grant an
affirmative right to vote.75 State constitutions also authorize their legislatures
to regulate absentee voting procedures.76 State absentee voting laws
prescribe varying levels of voter protections, such as universal vote-by-mail
whereby voters automatically receive a ballot;77 providing all registered
voters an application for absentee voting; and not requiring an excuse for
applying to vote absentee.78
B. Constitutional Challenges to State Election Codes
While the United States Constitution leaves states broad authority to
create election codes, states may not impose burdens on the right to vote that
conflict with other constitutional provisions. 79 But any restrictions that states
impose on voting will always exclude someone.80 Thus, courts consider
“whether the restriction and resulting exclusion are reasonable given the
interest the restriction serves.”81 Challenges to state voting laws frequently
invoke the First Amendment rights of expression and association and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses.82
To determine which level of scrutiny to apply and which constitutional
test to use, courts first assess the burden that a state law has on a political
party, a voter, or a class of voters.83 No litmus test exists for measuring the
severity of the burden, but a state must prove its interest outweighs the
75. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“[E]very citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years
or upwards, who is a resident of the State as of the time for the closing of registration next preceding
the election, shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which the citizen resides at
all elections to be held in this State.”); WIS. CONST. art. III (“Every United States citizen age 18 or
older who is a resident of an election district in this state is a qualified elector of that district.”). But
see generally ARIZ. CONST. art. VII (omitting a constitutional right to vote).
76. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. I, § 3a (“The General Assembly shall have the power to provide
by suitable enactment for voting by qualified voters of the State of Maryland who are absent at the
time of any election in which they are entitled to vote, for voting by other qualified voters who are
unable to vote personally, or for voting by qualified voters who might otherwise choose to vote by
absentee ballot, and for the manner in which and the time and place at which such absent voters
may vote, and for the canvass and return of their votes.”); WIS. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“Laws may be
enacted . . . [p]roviding for absentee voting.”).
77. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 254.470(3) (2020).
78. See, e.g., 2018 Md. H.B. 829 (2018).
79. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29, 34 (1968); Doe v. Walker, 746 F. Supp. 2d 667,
669 (D. Md. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (“It is axiomatic that a state may not erect obstacles
which deprive a group of citizens of the fundamental right to vote absent sufficient justification.”).
80. Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[S]tate legislatures may without
transgressing the Constitution impose extensive restrictions on voting. Any such restriction is going
to exclude, either de jure or de facto, some people from voting . . . .”).
81. Id.
82. See e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992).
83. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008).
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restriction on voting rights.84 Where a law severely burdens the right to vote,
courts apply a standard of strict scrutiny.85 For lesser burdens, courts use a
more deferential standard: the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.86
Meanwhile, in time-sensitive matters where courts assess injunctions and do
not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, courts frequently invoke
the Purcell principle.87
C. The Purcell Principle
In Purcell v. Gonzalez,88 the Supreme Court acknowledged the
importance of timing when a lower court issues an order concerning an
election.89 In that case, the State of Arizona—and officials from four of its
counties—sought relief from an interlocutory injunction issued by a Ninth
Circuit motions panel.90 The Ninth Circuit had issued an injunction of an
Arizona statute that required voters to present proof of citizenship when they
registered to vote and to provide identification when they voted in person.91
Voters who did not have the requisite identification could still vote in person
using a provisional ballot.92
The Court noted that the federal appellate court was asked to enjoin the
implementation of the voter identification procedures “just weeks before an
election,” and determined that it should have balanced the potential harms of
issuing or not issuing an injunction with “considerations specific to election
cases and its own institutional procedures.”93 The Court explained that court

84. Id. at 190–91. But see id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (defining the criteria
for determining the severity of burdens as follows: Those that are “[o]rdinary and widespread
burdens, such as those requiring ‘nominal effort’ of everyone, are not severe,” whereas those that
“go beyond the merely inconvenient” are severe).
85. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) (establishing that “any alleged
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized”); see
also Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and
citations omitted) (explaining where legislation burdens the right to vote, a state must show “that
the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest”).
86. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing how courts apply the
approach set out in Burdick to state statutes governing voter qualifications, candidate selection, and
the voting process); Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 970, n.13 (W.D.
Wis. 2020) (explaining that the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework evaluates “the
constitutional rules that apply to state election regulations” (quoting Harlan v. Scholz, 866 F.3d 754,
759 (7th Cir. 2017)); infra Section III.D.
87. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 3–5 (2006) (per curiam); see also infra Section III.C.
88. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam).
89. Id. at 3–5.
90. Id. at 2.
91. Id. at 2–3.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 4.
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orders close to an election increase the risks of voter confusion and voter
deterrence, although those issues alone do not control.94 The Court held that
the appellate court erred by failing to provide an explanation for its own
findings and by not giving deference to the district court’s conclusions.95
Ultimately, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s injunction and allowed the
election to proceed with those requirements in effect because the imminence
of the election did not provide enough time to resolve factual disputes.96
In multiple challenges to voter identification laws decided on
emergency motions where the Court has not issued a majority opinion, the
Court’s dissenters have applied Purcell to stand for the notion that decisions
too close to an election threaten voter confusion and disenfranchisement.97
For example, in Veasey v. Perry,98 the Court did not provide an opinion for
its decision to vacate a stay of a federal district court’s injunction of a Texas
voter identification law, which the district court found imposed an
unconstitutional burden on voters and violated the Voting Rights Act.99 In
dissent, Justice Ginsburg invoked Purcell to argue that since the district court
made an expedited schedule in November 2013 for resolving the case, “Texas
knew full well that the court would issue its ruling only weeks away from the
election.”100 Thus, the State had time to prepare for the possibility of an order
preventing enforcement of the voter identification law.101 In Frank v.
Walker,102 the Court vacated a stay of a permanent injunction that invalidated
a Wisconsin voting law that required voters to provide photo identification
before they could cast a vote.103 In dissent, Justice Alito noted the “proximity
of the upcoming general election” as support for the Court’s decision, before
rejecting the Court’s decision on other grounds.104 Later, dissenting in
Brakebill v. Jaeger,105 Justice Ginsburg argued that the Purcell principle
supported granting a preliminary injunction because the challenged North
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 5–6.
97. See Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 10 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Frank v. Walker,
574 U.S. 929, 929 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting); Brakebill v. Jaeger, 139 S. Ct. 10, 10–11 (2018)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
98. 135 U.S. 9 (2014).
99. See Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 633 (S.D. Tex. 2014), stayed, 769 F.3d 890, 892
(5th Cir. 2014), denying motion to vacate stay, 135 U.S. 9 (2014).
100. Veasey, 135 S. Ct. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014).
103. See Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 837, 842 (E.D. Wis. 2014), stayed, 766 F.3d 755,
756 (7th Cir. 2014), vacating stay, 135 S. Ct. 7, 7 (2014).
104. Frank, 134 S. Ct. at 7–8 (Alito, J., dissenting).
105. 139 S. Ct. 10 (2018).
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Dakota voter identification law created a severe risk of voter confusion and
disenfranchisement.106 She focused on the risk of voter confusion over the
proximity of the election, likely because the law was issued more than a year
before the election.107
D. The Anderson-Burdick Balancing Test
In Anderson v. Celebrezze,108 the Supreme Court considered whether
Ohio’s early filing deadline for a candidate to qualify for a position on the
state ballot placed an unconstitutional burden on a candidate’s supporters’
voting and associational rights.109 The Court determined that constitutional
challenges to state election laws cannot be resolved by any litmus test that
separately considers valid and invalid restrictions.110 Although state election
codes burden, to some degree, the individual’s right to vote or the right to
associate with others for political ends, the Court reasoned that states’
regulatory interests frequently substantiate “reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions.”111 Therefore, the Court prescribed an analytical process to
assess whether a state’s challenged provision of its election law places an
unconstitutional burden on voters’ First Amendment rights.112 Under this
framework, courts first weigh the asserted injury according to the rights
protected by the First Amendment and, second, consider the state’s interests
that support the burden imposed.113 After weighing these factors, courts
determine the constitutionality of the challenged provision.114
Nine years later, the Court applied the Anderson balancing test in
Burdick v. Takushi115 to uphold a Hawaii election law requiring a political
candidate to participate in a primary election prior to obtaining a position on
the general election ballot.116 In a challenge alleging violations of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court recognized that state election law
provisions imposing “‘severe’ restrictions” on voters’ rights must be
106. See Brakebill v. Jaeger, No. 1:16-cv-008, 2016 WL 7118548 (D.N.D. Aug. 1, 2016),
terminating injunction, 2018 WL 1612190, at *8 (D.N.D. Apr. 3, 2018), denying stay pending
appeal, 2018 WL 4714914, at *3 (D.N.D. Apr. 30, 2018), granting stay, 905 F.3d 553, 554 (8th Cir.
2018), denying motion to vacate stay, 139 S. Ct. 10, 10 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
107. Brakebill, 139 S. Ct. 10, 10 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Brakebill, 905 F.3d 553, 556
(8th Cir. 2018).
108. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
109. Id. at 782.
110. Id. at 789.
111. Id. at 788.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 789.
114. Id.
115. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
116. Id. at 430.
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“narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.”117
Accordingly, the Court noted the necessity of applying a strict scrutiny
standard.118 Meanwhile, the Court explained that where an election law
creates a lesser burden, a state does not need to establish a compelling
interest; “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” invoke only a rational
basis inquiry.119 In reaffirming Anderson’s requirement to weigh the asserted
injury to the right to vote against the State’s justifications for the burden
imposed by its statute, “Burdick forged Anderson’s amorphous ‘flexible
standard’ into something resembling an administrable rule.”120 Although
both Anderson and Burdick involved ballot-access cases, the Supreme Court
has applied the balancing standard in other types of challenges to state voting
laws.121 Where courts evaluate whether to grant preliminary injunctions of
state election laws facing constitutional challenges, they apply the AndersonBurdick test to assess the likelihood of success on the merits. 122
IV. ANALYSIS
In Republican National Committee, the Supreme Court stayed a grant
of a preliminary injunction that would have allowed ballots mailed and
postmarked after election day—but received within six days of the 2020
Wisconsin primary election—to be counted.123 The dispute over when
ballots needed to be received or postmarked emerged because of the
challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.124 Because the Court
117. Id. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
118. See id.; Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2009).
119. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433–34 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983));
Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 429.
120. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204–05 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434).
121. See Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 425, 429, 431 (upholding a district court’s application of
the Anderson-Burdick balancing test in a request for a preliminary injunction against an Ohio
election law that ended in-person early voting for non-military voters three days before the election
because it imposed an excessive burden on Plaintiffs by precluding a significant number of voters
from casting their ballots, of which their constituents constituted a large proportion); Crawford, 553
U.S. at 204 (describing the Supreme Court’s expansive application of the Anderson-Burdick
balancing test “[t]o evaluate a law respecting the right to vote—whether it governs voter
qualifications, candidate selection, or the voting process”).
122. “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v.
Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 429
(applying the Anderson-Burdick “flexible standard” where “a plaintiff alleges that a state has
burdened voting rights through the disparate treatment of voters” (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. at 434)).
123. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206 (2020) (per curiam).
124. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 957 (W.D. Wis. 2020).
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decided this case only one day before the election, the Court’s opinion
effectively served as a final judgment without a proper assessment of the
success on the merits or the harms to the parties and the public. 125 The
Court’s decision narrowed the scope of assessing absentee voting challenges
from one that involved a balancing of voters’ and states’ respective burdens
to one dependent upon the proximity of the election.126 For future challenges
to states’ absentee voting laws, this decision has the unfortunate effect of
marking a new era of reliance upon the Purcell principle that has perpetuated
voter disenfranchisement, while simultaneously reframing the Court’s role in
the judicial process and creating skepticism that partisanship influenced its
decision-making.127
Section IV.A criticizes the Court’s intervention in Republican National
Committee and the subsequent cases in the 2020 election cycle, and explores
how the Court jeopardized its legitimacy by giving the impression that it
based these decisions on partisan preferences.128 Section IV.B analyzes the
Court’s over-reliance on the Purcell principle, which is not a clear-cut rule,129
and examines how the Court’s application of the principle actually
contradicted the principle’s purpose.130 Section IV.C argues that the Court

125. The Court issued its opinion on April 6, 2020, and Wisconsin proceeded with its election
on April 7, 2020. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206. As the Court only considered
the timing of the election and the relief the plaintiffs requested in their preliminary injunction
motions, it did not assess the merits of the case. Id. at 1206–07; see also Richard L. Hasen, Reining
in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 428–29 (2016) (explaining that the Court’s
focus on the Purcell Principle can deter it from evaluating “the likelihood of success on the merits
and relative hardship to the parties,” which it typically considers “in deciding whether to grant or
vacate a stay or impose an injunction”).
126. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207; see also Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules
and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1836, 1861 (2013) (“The goal of balancing is to
condemn disproportionate burdens on the exercise of voting rights.”).
127. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Supreme Court Shouldn’t Decide Voting Cases. It
Keeps
Getting
Them
Wrong.,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
29,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/supreme-court-election-rulings/2020/10/29/6a7b65d61991-11eb-aeec-b93bcc29a01b_story.html (“[The Court’s] function is to resolve ‘important
question[s] of federal law.’ . . . By nevertheless granting review, over and over, the [C]ourt has
become exactly what it professes not to be: a tribunal that fixes the lower courts’ supposed mistakes,
even when they implicate no larger legal principle.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted);
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 123, 125
(2019) (“[T]he ‘shadow docket’ deprives affected parties . . . of the opportunity to fully brief and
argue the issue; creates at least a possibility of arbitrariness in implementation; and leaves a fog of
uncertainty as to exactly what the standards are in different categories of cases — a muddle that is
unhelpful to lower courts as it is to the parties.” (citing William Baude, Death and the Shadow
Docket,
REASON:
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Apr.
12,
2019,
3:30
PM),
https://reason.com/2019/04/12/death-and-the-shadow-docket/)); see also infra Section IV.A.
128. See infra Section IV.A.
129. See infra Section IV.B.1.
130. See infra Section IV.B.2.
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has relied on the Purcell principle at the expense of conducting the requisite
balancing analysis for election-related cases, where courts weigh the burdens
voters face against the state’s interests in the law.131 Finally, Section IV.D
critiques Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which properly framed the issue but
provided insufficient reasoning.132
A. The Court Jeopardized its Legitimacy by Allowing Partisanship to
Drive Its Decision-making
Republican National Committee and its progeny of 2020 general
election cases suggests that political interests motivated the outcomes at the
expense of thorough reasoning or deciding cases because of their legal, rather
than societal, implications.133 The Court did not have to intervene at all—
and should not have done so—because its opinions included sparse
explanations that disregarded legal precedents.134
1. The Court Erred in Relying on Its Shadow Docket Instead of Its
Standard “Merits” Docket
The Court relied on its shadow docket to decide Republican National
Committee and the subsequent 2020 general election voting cases.135
Consequently, these cases are marked by rushed opinions with little basis in
constitutional doctrine and which threaten the Court’s role and legitimacy.136
Typically, the Court assesses the merits of a case based on an appeal from a
lower court’s final decision; this standard docket is called the “merits”
docket.137 The process takes months and involves written briefing, oral
131. See infra Section IV.C.
132. See infra Section IV.D.
133. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 127.
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9 (2020) (Mem.), granting stay in part to
Middleton v. Andino, 488 F. Supp. 3d 261 (D.S.C. 2020) (upholding the witness requirement for
absentee ballots, except for ballots cast before the issuance of the stay and received within two days
of the order); Dem. Nat’l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 28 (2020) (Mem.), denying
stay to Dem. Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 2020) (rejecting the district court’s
six-day extension to accept absentee ballots as ordered in Republican National Committee); Scarnati
v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 644 (2020) (Mem.), denying cert. and stay to Pa. Dem. Party v. Boockvar,
238 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2020) (upholding the district court’s three-day extension for receiving absentee
ballots as long as they are postmarked by 8:00 PM on election day); Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct.
46 (2020) (Mem.), denying stay to Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93 (4th Cir. 2020) (upholding nineday extension for receiving absentee ballots after election day); Merrill v. People First of Ala.
(Mem.), 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020) (Mem.), granting stay to People First of Ala. v. Secretary of State
for Ala., 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179 (N.D. Ala. 2020) (upholding Alabama’s decision to ban curbside
voting).
136. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 127.
137. Id.
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argument, and a signed decision by the Court that provides thorough
reasoning.138 In contrast, parties in Republican National Committee and in
the 2020 general election emergency decisions that followed filed emergency
applications with the Supreme Court even before completion of the lower
court proceedings.139 After only a few days of briefing and no oral argument,
the Court issued unsigned opinions without explaining why it approved or
denied the relief sought.140
The Court’s approach has effectively altered its role from one that
decides important questions of federal law to one that corrects lower court
errors.141 In challenges to election laws, the Court has typically applied the
Anderson-Burdick balancing test to determine whether state election laws
unconstitutionally burden the right to vote.142 Although scholars criticize the
Anderson-Burdick test as “indeterminate” such that its implementation may
be “arbitrary,”143 it is important to follow this test as a matter of stare
decisis.144 The Court’s reasoning, which it provides in a formal, written
opinion that explains its careful evaluation of the parties’ arguments and that
considers precedent, has an important role in demonstrating to litigants and
the public that the result is not an arbitrary exercise of political power.145
Without reasoning, these decisions appear as political exercises of power that
support states restricting citizens’ abilities to vote.146

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Foley, supra note 126, at 1859; see also infra notes 237–241 and accompanying
text.
144. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (describing the importance of stare
decisis, which “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity
of the judicial process”).
145. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 127.
146. Id. (“When the court’s rulings are unreasoned . . . they don’t command the same respect.
They don’t demonstrate to litigants that their concerns have been heard. And to the public, they
seem more like exercises of political power than of judicial deliberation.”); Wendy R. Weiser,
Talking Election Law with the Brennan Center, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/talking-election-law-brennan-center (“If
the Supreme Court helps decide the presidency or control of the Senate by issuing a ruling that’s
sharply split on ideological lines, it would dramatically undermine confidence in both the court and
the election.”).
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2. Republican and Democratic Parties Have Competing Interests in
Administering Elections, and the Justices’ Opinions Reflect This
Divide
That most of the majority opinions in Republican National Committee
and the subsequent general election cases did not provide reasoning for
granting or denying requests for stays suggests that partisanship had an
important role.147 In election-related challenges, states have a compelling
interest to enforce state election laws that maintain order, prevent ambiguity,
and reduce confusion.148 Republicans have thus sought to protect prepandemic voting laws to increase voter confidence in the credibility of the
elections and to ease the administration of the elections.149 Republican efforts
have included restricting mail-in voting and early voting, prohibiting sending
ballot request forms to all registered voters, limiting placement of ballot drop
boxes, and tightening voter identification requirements.150 In contrast,
Democrats have aimed to suspend pre-COVID-19 election rules in order to
respond to the “surge in mail-in ballots due to the pandemic” and USPS
delays in order to ensure that ballots could arrive in time to be counted.151
Accordingly, Democrats have supported measures such as extending the
deadlines for receiving absentee ballots.152
The Justices’ opinions of election-related cases in the 2020 election
cycle reflected this partisan divide. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch153

147. See Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Pro-Partisan Turn, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 50,
50 (2020) (“The United States Supreme Court’s conservative majority has taken the Court’s election
jurisprudence on a pro-partisanship turn that gives political actors freer range to pass laws and enact
policies that can help entrench politicians—particularly Republicans—in power and insulate them
from political competition.”).
148. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 971 (W.D. Wis. 2020).
149. Lila Hassan & Dan Glaun, COVID-19 and the Most Litigated Presidential Election in
Recent U.S. History: How the Lawsuits Break Down, PBS FRONTLINE (Oct. 28, 2020)
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/covid-19-most-litigated-presidential-election-inrecent-us-history/.
150. Christina A. Cassidy and Ryan J. Foley, Some Republicans Worry Voting Limits Will Hurt
the GOP, Too, AP NEWS (May 7, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/tx-state-wire-donald-trumpelection-2020-business-voting-rights-bea2903cf9119ca427327acd2f307364.
151. See Jim Rutenberg & Nick Corasaniti, Kavanaugh’s Opinion in Wisconsin Voting Case
Raises Alarms Among Democrats,
N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
10/27/us/kavanaugh-voting-rights.html (last updated Nov. 3, 2020).
152. See Hassan & Glaun, supra note 149.
153. President Donald Trump, a Republican who did not win the popular vote, appointed Justices
Kavanaugh and Gorsuch, while Republican President George W. Bush, who also did not win a
plurality of the popular vote, appointed Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts. See Michael J.
Klarman, The Degradation of American Democracy—And the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1, 243
(2020). Republican President George H.W. Bush, who also did not receive the popular vote,
appointed Justice Thomas to the Court. United States Senate, Supreme Court Nominations (1789-
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consistently voted against the extensions and aligned with Republicans,
whereas Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor154 consistently voted for the
extensions and aligned with Democrats.155 However, Justice Kavanaugh and
Chief Justice Roberts sometimes interpreted Purcell more liberally than the
other Republican-appointed justices.156 For example, in the Pennsylvania157
and Wisconsin158 cases regarding the general election, Chief Justice Roberts
joined the liberal justices on the bench to deny injunctive relief to the
Republicans and uphold ballot extension deadlines.159 In the South Carolina
case regarding the general election, Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority
opinion and Justice Kavanaugh concurred in the decision to permit counting
completed ballots that lacked a witness signature.160
3. Republican National Committee Facilitated Partisanship in
Lower Courts’ Decisions
The Republican National Committee holding, which was based on a
“narrow, technical question,” suggested to lower courts that the Purcell
principle was a hard-and-fast rule that did not require traditional balancing
analyses of the burdens to voters against the interests of the state.161 As a
result, subsequent decisions at federal district and appellate levels regarding
the 2020 general election similarly relied on the Purcell principle and could
conduct constitutional balancing analyses according to partisan

Present), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.
htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
154. Democratic President Barack Obama appointed Justices Kagan and Sotomayor to the Court.
See
United
States
Senate,
Supreme
Court
Nominations
(1789-Present),
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm (last
visited Nov. 15, 2020).
155. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court May No Longer Have the Legitimacy to Resolve a
Disputed
Election,
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
3,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/supreme-court-elections/605899/ (last visited
Feb. 13, 2021) (“People have begun thinking and talking about ‘Republican justices’ and
‘Democratic justices,’ and public opinion about the Court now seems to diverge along party lines.”).
156. See Josh Gerstein, The Murky Legal Concept That Could Swing the Election, POLITICO
(Oct. 5, 2020, 7:58 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/05/murky-legal-concept-couldswing-the-election-426604.
157. Scarnati v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 724 (2020).
158. Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46 (2020); Wise v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 658 (2020).
159. See Scarnati v. Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 724 (2020); Moore v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 46 (2020);
Wise v. Circosta, 141 S. Ct. 658 (2020).
160. Andino v. Middleton, 141 S. Ct. 9, 9–10 (2020).
161. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206 (2020) (per curiam); see also Gerstein,
supra note 156 (describing the prevalence of the Purcell principle in the 2020 general election
cases).
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preferences.162 Just as the Court’s majority has taken a textualist approach
that is “unsolicitous toward protecting voting rights” when ruling in favor of
the Republican party,163 lower-court judges appointed by President Trump
frequently relied on the Purcell principle to favor maintaining restrictions on
mail-in voting, ballot deadlines, and signature requirements as compared to
judges nominated by President Obama.164 Trump-appointed judges have
largely supported the reasoning that state legislatures, not federal courts,
should set the rules for voting, even during a state of emergency.165 In
addition to invoking the Purcell principle more frequently to restrict voting
rights, confusion over how to balance burdens faced by voters and state’s
interests in administering the elections under Anderson-Burdick has
permitted conservative judges and justices to weigh concerns of voting fraud
more heavily.166
B. The Court’s Reliance on the Purcell Principle Resulted in Severe
Disenfranchisement and Election Chaos
In her dissenting opinion in Republican National Committee, Justice
Ginsburg properly reframed the issue from the majority’s assertion of a
“narrow, technical question about the absentee ballot process”167 to one about
whether voters can vote safely during the pandemic.168 But Republican
National Committee’s “narrow” holding was not narrow in its impact. 169
162. See Ann E. Marimow & Matt Kiefer, Judges Nominated by President Trump Play Key Role
in Upholding Voting Limits Ahead of Election Day, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2020, 8:00 AM)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/31/trump-judges-voting-rights/?arc404=true;
Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1836, 1838 (2013)
(explaining that judges “should not rule for Democrats and against Republicans because the judges
themselves are Democrats or prefer the Democratic Party, and vice versa,” but that exceedingly
narrow judicial rulings increase this risk).
163. See Edward B. Foley, The Supreme Court Ruling on Ballot Deadlines May be More of a
Reprieve for Democrats Than a Win, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2020, 7:56 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/20/supreme-court-ruling-ballot-deadlinesmay-be-more-reprieve-democrats-than-win/.
164. See Marimow & Kiefer, supra note 162.
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also infra Section IV.C; Hassan & Glaun, supra note 149 (describing an increase
among conservatives’ “spurious and unsubstantiated allegations of fraud” in litigation “against the
expansion of mail-in voting”). However, studies show that absentee-voter fraud is rare. Brent
Kendall & Alexa Corse, Coronavirus Intensifies Legal Tussle over Voting Rights; Pandemic Adds
Twist to Some Long-Simmering Controversies Playing Out During 2020 Election Cycle, WALL ST.
J. (Apr. 19, 2020, 2:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-intensifies-legal-tussleover-voting-rights-11587315601.
167. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206 (2020) (per curiam).
168. Id. at 1211 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169. Contra Foley, supra note 126, at 1837–38 (explaining that narrow judicial rulings make it
harder for people to “determine whether a future court is being unprincipled in refusing to apply the
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Rather, it served as a prelude to the voting cases leading up to the November
2020 general election, which have deterred minor changes to the election
process that would mitigate disenfranchisement resulting from COVID-19.170
While the pandemic forced polling locations to close and created serious
public health risks for those voting in person, it also posed significant
obstacles to those voting absentee.171 The surge in absentee ballot requests
overwhelmed state election commissions and the resulting backlogs in
processing these requests, coupled with pandemic-caused mail delays,
exacerbated the likelihood that voters would not receive and be able to return
their ballots in time to be counted.172
The 2020 General Election involved “a record-breaking amount of
litigation”173 and “[a] record number of votes” cast absentee174 that reflected
a strong partisan divide regarding absentee ballots.175 While more Democrats
wanted to vote by mail for the 2020 election, more Republicans wanted to
vote in person, in accordance with the Republican Party’s reassurance that
voters could do so safely.176 The Court did not provide explanations for many
precedent in new circumstances” because they “do[] not tell future judges enough about what is
factually important in the precedent case to assess whether future cases are relevantly similar or
dissimilar”).
170. See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Failing to Respect the Passive Virtues: A Critique of RNC v.
DNC, ELECTION L. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2020, 6:59 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=110999#_ftn2
(“My deepest concern about the opinion that was issued is that it has very likely foreclosed modest
adjustments in election adjustments when future courts are faced with elections where
circumstances like the pandemic are impacting the ability to vote.”).
171. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 961 (W.D. Wis. 2020); see
also infra note 204 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d at 957–58, 961.
173. Hassan & Glaun, supra note 149; see also Stanford-MIT, COVID-Related Election
Litigation
Tracker,
HEALTHY
ELECTIONS
PROJECT,
https://healthyelections-casetracker.stanford.edu/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (showing that prior to the election more than 400
lawsuits had been filed in 44 states, and following the election, that number surpassed 500 in 46
states plus Washington, D.C.).
174. See Drew Desilver, Most Mail and Provisional Ballots Got Counted in Past U.S. Elections
– But Many Did Not, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/11/10/most-mail-and-provisional-ballots-got-counted-in-past-u-s-elections-but-manydid-not/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2021) (estimating 65 million voters cast absentee ballots).
175. Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Will SCOTUS Rulings Help Decide the 2020
Presidential Election?, ABA J. (Sept. 2, 2020, 10:18 AM CDT), https://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/chemerinsky-will-supreme-court-rulings-help-decide-the-2020-election. (“This is an
election where Republicans, led by President Donald Trump, are seeking to limit absentee ballots,
and Democrats expand them. It is one where Democrats are likely to bring lawsuits to enlarge the
ability of people to vote and Republicans are likely to oppose them.”).
176. Russell Berman, If You Can Grocery Shop in Person, You Can Vote in Person, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/09/voting-duringpandemic-pretty-safe/616084/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2021); see also Brent Kendall & Alexa Corse,
supra note 166 (explaining that Democrats support vote-by-mail expansion, and while some
Republican-led states are also advancing vote-by-mail options, “[President] Trump and the RNC
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of its emergency decisions, but the parties’ briefs, lower courts’ analyses, and
Justices’ concurrences and dissents suggest that the Court’s application of
Purcell in Republican National Committee was a deciding factor in many of
its decisions.177 Rather than preventing confusion and disenfranchisement,
however, reliance on the Purcell principle in this context generated further
restrictions so that fewer votes counted.178
1. The Court Gave Too Much Weight to an Ambiguous Principle
In Republican National Committee, the Court primarily relied on the
Purcell principle,179 which is a “shadow doctrine” that lacks a clearly defined
analytical framework and frequently arises in the Supreme Court’s “shadow
docket.”180 The Purcell principle suggests that courts should not issue orders
affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, close to an election because
as the election approaches, the likelihood that those orders cause voter
confusion and disenfranchisement increases.181 These “considerations
specific to election cases and [their] own institutional procedures”182 attempt
to prevent electoral chaos among voters and election officials that result from
changing or conflicting orders close to the election.183
Yet, the Court has not clearly defined the contours of the Purcell
principle, including what the cutoff time of an election is or how flexibly the
oppose nationwide mail-in voting” because “not all states could have the logistics in place by
November and . . . it could open the door to ballot tampering and other fraud”); Pew Research
Center, 4. Voter Engagement and Interest, Voting By Mail and In Person, In: Amid Campaign
Turmoil, Biden Holds Wide Leads on Coronavirus, Unifying the Country (Oct. 9, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/10/09/voter-engagement-and-interest-voting-by-mailand-in-person/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2021) (reporting findings from an August poll conducted before
states began general election voting, where 60% of Trump supporters preferred to vote in person on
Election Day and 17% preferred to vote by mail, but 23% of Biden supporters preferred to vote in
person on Election Day and 58% preferred to vote by mail).
177. See Gerstein, supra note 156; Connor Clerkin et al., Mail Voting Litigation During the
Coronavirus Pandemic, Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://healthyelections.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/Mail_Voting_Litigation_0.pdf (anticipating
that courts would increasingly consider the Purcell principle as the election approached).
178. See Hassan & Glaun, supra note 149.
179. See supra Part II.
180. Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Freeing Purcell from the Shadows, TAKE CARE BLOG (Sept. 27,
2020), https://takecareblog.com/blog/freeing-purcell-from-the-shadows (describing “shadow
doctrines” as “rules the Court applies only in its non-merits cases” and the Court’s “shadow docket”
as “disputes . . . resolve[d] summarily, without the usual briefing, argument, explanations, or even
indications how each Justice voted”); see also William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s
Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY, 5 (2015) (describing the Court’s “shadow docket” as its
“non-merits work”); supra text accompanying notes 135–140.
181. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam).
182. Id. at 4.
183. Hasen, supra 125, at 441.
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principle can be interpreted.184 This uncertainty traces back to the Purcell
opinion, where the Court held that the Ninth Circuit failed to consider
election-specific considerations and potential harms resulting from issuing or
not issuing an injunction, while not providing the necessary deference to the
district court’s findings.185 The uncertainty arises from the Court’s failure to
specify which factor drove its decision to vacate the Ninth Circuit’s
injunction of Arizona voter identification procedures: the failure of the Ninth
Circuit to give reasons for its order; the Ninth Circuit’s failure to make
“considerations specific to election cases and its own institutional
procedures;” or the close timing of the election and the possibility of en banc
review.186
Importantly, the Purcell principle is only one factor of many that courts
consider when issuing emergency stays.187 Courts also consider the
likelihood of success on the merits, the potential for irreparable injury to both
parties, and the public interest.188 However, these considerations “cannot be
controlling.”189 Courts must give some level of deference to the lower court’s
decision.190 Additionally, courts typically apply the Anderson-Burdick
balancing test’s lower level of scrutiny to challenges of infringement on
voting rights to assess the likelihood of success on the merits.191 In Purcell,
the Court did not apply this balancing analysis—it did not evaluate the harms
to the parties beyond considering the public’s interest in not changing the
rules close to an election.192
In Republican National Committee, the Court narrowly applied the
Purcell principle to stand for the notion that lower federal courts should not
change “the election rules on the eve of an election,” so as to avoid the
“judicially created confusion” that might result from ballots being mailed and
postmarked after election day.193 The district court subsequently enjoined
the public release of any election results until six days after election day, but

184. Gerstein, supra note 156.
185. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4–5.
186. Hasen, supra 125, at 440 (quoting Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4.).
187. Id. at 428.
188. Id. at 441, 444; see also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009) (internal citations
omitted) (establishing the standards for granting or vacating a stay as likelihood of success on the
merits, irreparable harm to the movant, harm to other parties, and the public interest). Professor
Richard L. Hasen advocates for the Purcell principle to fall into the public interest prong but argues
that these concerns should not be the sole consideration. Hasen, supra note 125, at 441.
189. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (per curiam).
190. Id.
191. See supra 122 and accompanying text.
192. Hasen, supra note 125, at 443.
193. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1206–1207 (2020) (per curiam).
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the Court doubted that order’s effectiveness.194 The Court surmised that,
despite the order, information would be released that would affect the
integrity of the election process,195 likely by informing voters of which
candidate led in the precinct and thereby motivating the behavior of voters
who had not yet cast their ballots.
The Court’s analysis gave too much weight to the Purcell principle
without accounting for considerations specific to granting stays and other
election-specific concerns.196 Like the appellate court in Purcell, the Court
in Republican National Committee failed to consider the likelihood of
success on the merits, the relative irreparable harm to the parties, and the
public interest factors.197 By not considering these factors, the Court also
erred by not providing deference to the lower court’s factual findings of
irreparable harm, inadequate remedies at law, and the likelihood of success
on the merits.198 In particular, the Court disregarded the district court’s
application of the Anderson-Burdick balancing test and conclusion “that the
existing deadlines for absentee voting would unconstitutionally burden
Wisconsin citizens’ right to vote.”199
By not providing deference to the district court’s factual findings and
by failing to adequately show why these findings were incorrect, the Court
did not follow the holding in Purcell.200 A significant issue involved the
Court’s failure to consider COVID-19;201 instead, it treated this case as it
would “an ordinary election.”202 The Court did not acknowledge the district
court’s findings of fact regarding the current state of the COVID-19 health
crisis, the increased reliance on absentee ballots, and the dangers of voting in
person.203 For example, the Court did not consider the district court’s
findings that the number of absentee ballots requested dwarfed those in the
previous four spring elections by tenfold; the state election board could not
process the surge in requests, resulting in severe backlogs; voters could not
easily vote in person; the public health risk of voting in person, especially for
senior poll workers; or most importantly, the estimated 27,500 absentee
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (per curiam); Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S.
Ct. at 1206–1208.
197. See supra text accompanying note 192; Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206–1208.
198. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1206–1208.
199. Id. at 1209 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
200. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. at 4–5.
201. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1210 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s
suggestion that the current situation is not ‘substantially different’ from ‘an ordinary election’
boggles the mind.”).
202. See id. at 1207.
203. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 960 (W.D. Wis. 2020).
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ballots projected to be received after 8:00 P.M. on the day of the election that
would not be counted.204
The Court’s minimal analysis and its reliance on the Purcell principle
as its primary justification—which itself is neither a “hard-and-fast rule” nor
“well developed”205—demonstrates the decision’s improper application of
the doctrines historically applied to voting challenges. Additionally, the
vagueness of the Purcell principle has resulted in its unpredictable
application that threatens a partisan result.206
2. The Court’s Application of the Purcell Principle Contradicted the
Principle’s Purpose by Causing Further Election Chaos and
Disenfranchisement
The Court relied on the Purcell principle to argue that the lower federal
courts cannot change election rules immediately before the election because
doing so will result in judicially created confusion.207 The Court, however,
misapplied the Purcell principle by only discussing a portion of the principle
and not weighing other critical election-specific considerations.208 This
resulted an outcome that contravened the principle’s purpose. The principle
provides that as an election draws closer, the risk will increase that a court’s
orders will “result in voter confusion” and, consequently, push voters “away
from the polls.”209 Additionally, “electoral chaos” may result from
“conflicting court orders” telling election officials “how to run an
election.”210
The application of Purcell depends on the kind of policy being
challenged.211 Policies establishing the basic building blocks of the election,
such as at-large voting, should almost never be changed close to an
election.212 However, policies incapable of causing voter confusion because
they apply only to administrators, such as implementing a signature match

204. Id. at 961–62.
205. Gerstein, supra note 156.
206. Id.; see also supra Section IV.A.2 (discussing partisan trends in the Court’s election-related
decisions).
207. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1207.
208. Id.
209. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam); see also Hasen, supra note 125,
at 441 (“When the rules for elections change, voters may not only be confused; they can be
disenfranchised (for example, by not having the right documentation or showing up at the wrong
polling place).”).
210. Hasen, supra note 125, at 441.
211. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 180 (“[C]ourts shouldn’t assume that this probability is
high; they should assess it based on the best available evidence.”).
212. Id.
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requirement, do not invoke the Purcell principle.213 Extending the deadline
for absentee voting during the pandemic falls in between the two ends of the
spectrum, and, therefore, the Court should have considered the remedy’s
impacts on voter confusion and disenfranchisement.214
Although a direct application of the Purcell principle requires a
reviewing court to stay a lower court’s order issued in the days leading up to
the election, the Court in Republican National Committee misapplied the
principle by overlooking important election-specific concerns.215 First, by
looking only at the public’s interest in not changing the election rules close
to an election, the Court omitted Purcell’s concern for disenfranchisement
and did not account for the inevitable confusion that would result in the midst
of a global pandemic.216 The Court ignored the “certainty that thousands of
ballots [would] arrive after the April 7, 2020 deadline.”217 Consequently,
tens of thousands of absentee voters, who timely requested their absentee
ballots, did not receive their ballots in time for their votes to be counted. 218
Voters who did not receive their ballots in time were forced to choose
between sacrificing their fundamental political right to vote 219 and risking
their health and safety to vote in person.220 And in the City of Madison,

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Hasen, supra note 125, at 441–42.
216. Id.; see also Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam).
217. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 975 (W.D. Wis. 2020).
218. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1210 (2020) (per curiam) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). However, during the “extended period, nearly 80,000 additional votes arrived and were
counted, according to the Wisconsin Elections Commission.” Brent Kendall and Jess Bravin,
Supreme Court Rejects Pandemic-Spurred Voting Changes in Wisconsin, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26,
2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-denies-extended-mail-ballot-deadline-inwisconsin-11603758108. See also The New York Times, Wisconsin Primary Recap: Voters Forced
to Choose Between Their Health and Their Civic Duty, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/politics/wisconsin-primary-election.html (reporting on
election day that “[o]fficial state figures showed that of 1,282,762 ballots requested, 1,273,374 had
been sent, a shortfall of about 9,000”).
219. Contra Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 2 (2006) (voters could cast provisional ballots);
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 186 (2008) (same).
220. To Members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives (May 5, 2020),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2020/05/05061221/21DemocracyTeam_finalma
ilvotingandcovid19.pdf?_ga=2.104965632.2029394591.1603550377-683790534.1603550377; see
also Nick Corasaniti & Reid J. Epstein, At Least 7 in Wisconsin Got Coronavirus During Voting,
Officials
Say,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
13,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/21/us/politics/wisconsin-election-coronavirus-cases.html
(documenting that at least seven people contracted COVID-19 from voting in-person based on only
30% of the data); CDC Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), Polling Locations and Voters,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html
(last
updated Jan. 4, 2021) (warning against in-person voting because of crowds and longer wait times);
see also The New York Times, Wisconsin Primary Recap: Voters Forced to Choose Between Their
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“[h]undreds of absentee ballots” that voters mailed back—likely before
election day—did not have a postmark and risked invalidation.221
The Court also failed to consider that its stay created further confusion.
Election officials had already spent the previous few days establishing
procedures and informing voters in accordance with the district court’s
deadline.222 Requiring election officials to change instructions even closer to
the deadline only increases the state’s burdens, as states then have to supply
additional resources to train poll worker volunteers on new rules and
procedures and develop new written instructions just before the election.223
These changes could also make voters more confused, as they relied on
other guidance (i.e., the guidance prepared in accordance with the district
court’s order) issued only days before.224 Although, even if the district
court’s extension of the deadline for receiving absentee ballots caused
confusion, that confusion did not leave voters in a worse position than
before—rather, a better one. Sending in a ballot according to the statutory
deadline, which was earlier than the district court’s change required, still
meant that those ballots counted.225 But the confusion caused by the Court’s
postmarked-by requirement left voters in a worse position because voters had
to act immediately for their votes to count, and voters who timely requested
their absentee ballots could not vote if they had not yet received their
ballots.226
Additionally, the Court did not acknowledge the district court’s finding
that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits, which it
determined by primarily relying on the evidence indicating inevitable

Health
and
Their
Civic
Duty,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
7,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/us/politics/wisconsin-primary-election.html (explaining that
in Milwaukee, where the predominately black northern part of the city experienced the highest rates
of COVID-19, voters—overwhelmingly black and Hispanic—who had not cast absentee ballots
waited in line for hours to vote in person).
221. Laura Schulte and Patrick Marley, Many Wisconsin Absentee Ballots Returned Without
Postmarks and May Not Be Counted Because of It, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/2020/04/10/wisconsin-election-votes-may-not-countballots-without-postmark/5123238002/ (Apr. 12, 2020, 9:29 AM CT).
222. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1210 (2020) (per curiam) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
223. See Hasen, supra note 125, at 441.
224. See e.g., Linda Schmidt, Confused About Voting? Your Options for Election Day 2020,
FOX5 N.Y. (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.fox5ny.com/news/confused-about-voting-your-optionsfor-election-day-2020; Reid J. Epstein, Confused About Voting? Here are Some Easy Tips, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/voting-tips.html.
225. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
226. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1209 (2020) (per curiam) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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disenfranchisement.227 The district court extended the absentee ballot
deadline after careful analysis of the respective harms with the aim to
minimize the 2020 election chaos—particularly voters’ confusion about how
to vote—that resulted from the rapidly evolving COVID-19 pandemic.228
Even if the likelihood of success demonstrated greater certainty, invoking a
“complex balancing” analysis that accurately accounts for the severity of
voter confusion and disenfranchisement should have led the Court to deny
the stay.229 By narrowly considering that lower courts’ changes to election
rules close to the election result in confusion, the Court’s decision to change
the election rules even closer to the election did not prevent judicially-related
confusion and disenfranchisement; it facilitated confusion and
disenfranchisement.230
The Court’s reliance on the Republican National Committee framework,
which itself narrowly applied the Purcell principle at the expense of weighing
election-related considerations along with the harms of issuing or not issuing
an injunction, has prevented flexibility in a time of crisis.231 As a
consequence, the Court has implicitly undermined the long-established
fundamental political right to vote.232 This result calls into question the
applicability of the Purcell principle, particularly during times of crisis,
where it has been used as an excuse to restrict voting rights.233
C. The Court’s Emphasis on the Purcell Principle Masked Its Failure
to Apply the Requisite Balancing Test for Deciding Election Cases
Election law’s federalist approach requires some system of regulation.
Accordingly, the Anderson-Burdick “flexible balancing test” provides a
227. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 451 F. Supp. 3d 952, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2020).
228. See supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text.
229. See Hasen, supra note 125, at 443.
230. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1210 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
231. See supra Section IV.A.3.
232. Wendy Weiser & Daniel Weiner, The Supreme Court’s “Breathtakingly Radical” New
Approach to Election Law, POLITICO MAG.
(Nov. 22, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/11/22/supreme-court-election-law-voting-rights438844 (explaining that the Court’s decisions ultimately limited voting access responses to the
pandemic that the federal courts had generally permitted and disenfranchised tens of thousands of
Americans, particularly people of color).
233. See Rick Hasen, The Biggest Problem with the Supreme Court’s Opinion in the Wisconsin
Voting Case Was Not the Result (Which Was Still Wrong), But the Court’s Sloppiness and
Nonchalance About Voting Rights and What That Means for November, ELECTION L. BLOG (Apr.
10, 2020, 12:39 PM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=110647 (advocating for courts to abandon the
Purcell principle when an emergency outside the parties’ control causes a court to issue an
emergency election order); Hassan & Glaun, supra note 149 (explaining that abiding by the Purcell
principle can prevent necessary changes to voting laws that prevent voters from having their votes
counted).
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mechanism for the Court to employ to determine whether “a state’s rules and
procedures . . . violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”234
Yet, in Republican National Committee, the Court rigidly applied the
Purcell principle, without mentioning the Anderson-Burdick balancing test,
to avoid making much-needed changes to old election rules that would
consider voters’ health and safety during a global pandemic.235 While it is
possible that the Court conducted an implicit balancing analysis,236 the
majority’s failure to acknowledge Anderson or Burdick likely suggests that
the Court is continuing to grapple with its implementation, rather than
outright rejecting it.237 The Court has not yet articulated a uniform approach
for weighing burdens on the right to vote with the state’s interests.238 Despite
the Court’s failure to provide clear guidance on how to apply AndersonBurdick, lower courts continue to rely on it.239 As with the ambiguous
Purcell principle, this lack of guidance can provide judges with too much

234. See Edward B. Foley, supra note 126, at 1847.
235. See supra text accompanying note 193.
236. See Foley, supra note 126, at 1852 (suggesting that Bush v. Gore had “an implicit element
of balancing”).
237. Id. at 1847. The Court has not yet agreed on the method for balancing the burdens under
the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. See Brief of Erwin Chemerinsky as amicus curiae in support
of neither party [Applicable Legal Standard], at 12, Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553
U.S.
181,
190
(2008),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legalwork/e91c0b5e230c0db479_2jm6b17yw.pdf (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337, 305
(1972)) (arguing that in Crawford, the Court should clarify confusion faced in the lower courts about
which level of constitutional scrutiny to apply by reaffirming the validity of the Dunn line of cases,
which apply strict scrutiny to lawsuits alleging the complete denial of the right to vote); Foley, supra
note 126, at 1853–54 (arguing that the Court’s “imprecise . . . reasoning” in Bush v. Gore, Anderson,
Burdick, and Crawford makes them impossible to square with each other and creates confusion and
uncertainty for lower courts in their voting law jurisprudence).
238. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. at 200; id. at 204–05 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); id. at 218 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 237 (Breyer, J., dissenting). While the plurality
in Crawford considered the burdens on a “voter-specific basis,” the Scalia concurrence rejected this
approach and engaged in “wholesale balancing: weighing the law’s burden on all voters collectively,
as compared to the state’s across-the-board interests in adopting the law.” Foley, supra note 126,
at 1848–49 (emphasis added).
239. Foley, supra note 126, at 1854, 1859; see also Joshua A. Douglas, A Tale of Two Election
Law Standards, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/a-taleof-two-election-law-standards/ (surmising that “Anderson-Burdick balancing is itself flawed, and
the courts must recognize the centrality of the right to vote to our democratic system and impose
stringent rules on governments that try to infringe on that right”); Derek T. Muller, The Fundamental
Weakness of Flabby Balancing Tests in Federal Election Law Litigation, EXCESS OF DEMOCRACY
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2020/4/the-fundamental-weakness-offlabby-balancing-tests-in-federal-election-law-litigation (explaining that the Anderson-Burdick
balancing test “is unusually weak as a vehicle for protecting ‘voting rights’ under the Constitution”).
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discretion to decide cases according to their own political beliefs,240 which
can be problematic in policy-related cases.241
Meanwhile, too flexible of an application of Purcell—one that
disregards the importance of timing altogether and relies solely on the also
indeterminate Anderson-Burdick inquiry—would allow Courts to more
easily change election rules just before an election. In addition to creating
confusion among voters, changing election rules can also cause confusion
among election officials, which may lead to mistakes in administering the
elections.242
The Court has not yet clarified the contours of either the Purcell
principle243 or the Anderson-Burdick balancing test244 and did not apply them
in conjunction with each other in Republican National Committee.245 Thus,
it was insufficient for the Court to rely on the Purcell principle alone as a
“hard-edged rule.”246 Purcell itself emphasizes the importance of deference
to a lower court’s findings of fact, consideration of the harms to the parties,
and evaluation of factors specific to election cases.247 Accordingly, the Court
should rely on it as a standard that, in addition to considering the factors that
Purcell articulates—the proximity of the election and the likelihood of new
rules creating confusion and disenfranchisement—also considers other
election-specific concerns, such as the probability of election officials
making errors when administering the elections and the timing of the

240. Muller, supra note 239 (citing Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396, 423 (6th Cir. 2020) (Readler,
J., concurring in the judgment)) (“The temptation to overindulge in the Anderson-Burdick test has
not gone unnoticed.”). The Anderson-Burdick test “allow[s] a judge ‘easily [to] tinker[ ] with levels
of scrutiny to achieve [his or her] desired result.’” Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396, 423 (6th Cir.
2020) (Readler, J., concurring in the judgment) (second, third, and fourth alternations in original)
(quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2327 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)); see also Foley, supra note 126, at 1859 (expressing concern that judges can abuse the
Anderson-Burdick balancing’s vague standard to decide cases to achieve their own desired result,
without considering the law, and that this may become binding “if a majority of the Supreme Court
chooses to be willfully disobedient to the Court’s own precedent”).
241. Muller, supra note 239 (citing Daunt, 956 F.3d at 424 (Readler, J., concurring in the
judgment)) (“In sensitive policy-oriented cases, it affords far too much discretion to judges in
resolving the dispute before them.”).
242. Stephanopoulos, supra note 180 (“Court orders can disrupt administrators’ familiar
routines, compel them to make determinations for which they lack training or experience, and
extend how long each step in the process takes. As a result, the vote count can be slowed or even
rendered inaccurate thanks to election officials’ missteps under the new court-imposed rules.”); see
also supra notes 222–223 and accompanying text.
243. Id. (“[T]he Purcell principle remains remarkably opaque.”).
244. See supra notes 237 and 238 and accompanying text.
245. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020) (per curiam).
246. Stephanopoulos, supra note 180.
247. See supra text accompanying notes 93 and 95.
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litigation compared to when the law was enacted.248 As the Purcell principle
invokes a multi-factor test, the Court would help future applications of the
test by clearly articulating how it weighed each of the relevant factors in its
decisions.
D. Though It Accurately Defined the Issue, the Dissent Also Did Not
Properly Apply the Requisite Constitutional Analyses
In her dissenting opinion in Republican National Committee, Justice
Ginsburg properly articulated the issue as assessing the burden on voters but
offered limited support.249 Her dissent cited the district court’s AndersonBurdick balancing analysis, which concluded that the pre-COVID-19
statutory deadlines for receiving absentee votes “would unconstitutionally
burden Wisconsin citizens’ right to vote.”250 However, she never mentioned
the importance of employing that balancing test, she did not apply the test
herself, and finally, she did not discuss the Court’s failure to cite to Anderson
or Burdick.251 Similarly, she referenced the Court’s reliance on the Purcell
principle, but did not properly apply it.252
Justice Kagan’s analysis in Democratic National Committee v.
Wisconsin State Legislature253 highlights the aspects of Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent that could have been more robust.254 In that case, Justice Kagan
averred that the Court’s decision would disenfranchise large numbers of
voters who timely requested and mailed their ballots but whose ballots did
not arrive in time to be counted due to mail delays.255 There, Justice Kagan
applied the Anderson-Burdick balancing test to determine whether the
disenfranchisement resulting from backlogs and mail delays imposed a
severe burden on the right to vote.256 She criticized the appellate court’s
“fixati[on] on timing alone” and explained why it had misapplied the Purcell

248. Stephanopoulos, supra note 180.
249. See Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1211 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 1209.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1210.
253. 141 S. Ct. 28 (2020).
254. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
255. See Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 40 (2020)
(Kagan, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court refused to extend the deadline on October 26, 2020,
and as of October 27, 2020, 320,000 outstanding absentee ballots needed to be submitted by election
day on November 3. Scott Bauer, Supreme Court Ruling Spurs Wisconsin to Get Early Votes In,
AP NEWS https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-virus-outbreak-madison-wisconsin-elections76c789b1fdda33aa71f73fc86ef44dcd.
256. Wisconsin State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 41 (2020) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Supreme Court for “never even address[ing] [that] constitutional issue”).
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principle.257 She reasoned extending the absentee ballot-receipt deadline
would not confuse voters because the worst outcome would be that voters
mail their ballots a few days early.258 Moreover, counting votes does not
“undermine the ‘integrity’ of [the democratic] process,” whereas discarding
“timely cast ballots that, because of pandemic conditions, arrive a bit after
Election Day,” does.259
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent did not highlight the Court’s complete
disregard of the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.260 Though the test is
imperfect,261 it is important for the Court to apply longstanding procedures
for determining the constitutionality of state election laws.262 Additionally,
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent suggested that the Court improperly relied on the
Purcell principle, but did not explain how it misapplied it, beyond its
hypocrisy of changing the election laws closer to the election than the district
court, and its failure to consider that the district court was responding to a
“rapidly developing public health crisis.”263 A more substantive analysis
would have shed more light on how the Court erred and could have
influenced subsequent decisions in cases leading up to the election.
V. CONCLUSION
In Republican National Committee, the United States Supreme Court
effectively modified the district court’s six-day extension for receiving
absentee ballots by requiring that absentee voters postmark their ballots by
Election Day.264 Ultimately, the Court’s reliance on and interpretation of the
Purcell principle, along with its failure to explicitly assess the burdens on
voters during the pandemic, jeopardized the ability of tens of thousands of
voters who timely requested ballots to exercise their right to vote.265 The
Court’s inadequate analysis in Republican National Committee laid the
foundation for the Court’s subsequent emergency decisions as the 2020
general election approached and created the impression that its decisions
were made according to partisan preferences.266 It also raises important

257. Id. at 41–42 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
258. Id. at 42.
259. Id.
260. Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1209 (2020) (per
curiam) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
261. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
263. Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 1210–11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 1206.
265. Id. at 1211; see also supra note 218 and accompanying text.
266. Id.; see supra Section IV.A.
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concerns for the future of the Court’s role in voting cases267 and its continued
reliance on the Purcell principle in emergency situations as an inflexible
rule.268 In failing to engage in a constitutional balancing analysis, the Court
signaled that courts could rely on the Purcell principle in lieu of following
the Anderson-Burdick precedent.269 Finally, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent did
not go far enough in exposing the Court’s insufficient reasoning, which was
marked by its avoidance in following established constitutional
procedures.270 Importantly, the Court’s decisions in Republican National
Committee and its progeny, all marked by little to no reasoning, leave open
critical questions about the Court’s legitimacy and its future prioritization of
the fundamental political right to vote.271

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

See Stephanopolous, supra note 127.
See Hasen, supra, note 233 and accompanying text; supra Section IV.B.
See supra Section IV.C.
See supra Section IV.D.
See supra Section IV.A.

